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by both the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the course of the Diet session, and more lately by that made by the former at the recent conference of Prefectural Governors to the effect that Japan intended by strengthening the Anti-Comintern pact to meet the tense international situation from its own independent standpoint (please see my telegram No. 405 of the 9th May)
5. Nothing has appeared in the press to show what actually transpired during the struggle in the Cabinet between the advocates of an alliance and their opponents, the main scene of which has been set in a series of five-Minister conferences. It is understood that the reason for this is that a ban has been placed on the publication of anything on the subject of the possibility of the conclusion of a military alliance with the Axis Powers, in view of which the press in reporting the comings and goings of Ministers have had to content themselves with stating that the subject under discussion was the policy to be followed vis-à-vis the situation in Europe. It seems sufficiently clear, however, that the main supporters of an alliance were the army, who have taken a very strong line, and that the Prime Minister has been at pains to steer a course midway between the extremists and the moderates. A staunch believer in Anglo-Japanese friendship has more than once described the position to me as being one in which an organised minority were endeavouring to impose their views on unorganised majority. He said that the latter, consisting of the intellectual classes and business interests, were quite convinced that too intimate a friend- ship with Germany was unwise, but that the former were equally convinced that their views were right and their fear of Russia made it impossible to convince them that they were wrong.
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6. This summing up of the situation seems to have been accurate, though there is reason to believe that at one moment the clash of views in the Cabinet threatened a serious political crisis. I have it on excellent authority that, while the Cabinet was still divided and undecided, the Emperor intervened decisively and intimated clearly to the army that he was opposed to the proposal for an alliance and that some other solution must be found which would not commit Japan to hostilities as a result of the outbreak of a war in Europe. The decisiveness of this intervention has been compared with the strong line taken by His Majesty after the incident of February 1936, and shows that, while the Imperial prerogative is used sparingly, it can still be used with effect when occasion demands.
7. For the moment, a decision against the conclusion of an alliance has definitely been reached, but the reactionary elements have been left irritated and discomfited. To placate these powerful circles, a strengthening of the Anti- Comintern pact in some form is generally considered to be essential, but there is no sure information as to what precise form the new pact will take or whether the new formula, if evolved, will prove acceptable to the Axis. In this respect the Government has not seen fit to take the country into its confidence, and the position remains obscure with opinion in general inclining to the view that for the moment a compromise between the conclusion of an alliance and leaving things as they are has been effected (please see my telegram No. 458 of the 21st May). All that is certain is that the German Government have not abandoned hope of attaining their ends and that German pressure on Japan is continuing. 8. The struggle between the advocates of an alliance and the more cautious sections of the nation has been well reflected in the press. The leading papers, such as the Asahi, the Nichi Nichi and the Chugai, have in the main refrained from discussion of the subject, taking an objective view of the situation. The reactionary press, however, represented by the Yomiuri and more especially the Kokumin, have consistently advocated the strengthening of the Anti-Comintern pact, making it clear that by this they mean the conclusion of a military alliance with the Axis Powers. And in this connexion it may be of interest to record that the Hochi appears recently to have joined the ranks of the extremists, for in a leading article in its issue of the 20th May it took the Government sharply to task for its failure to take the country into its confidence as to the decision reached by the five-Minister conference. It drew attention to the fact that both the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs had expressed approval of the alliance concluded between Germany and Italy on the 22nd May and had expressed a hope that relations between Japan and those two countries would be
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consolidated. The fact that Japan had not been a party to the alliance was there- fore very puzzling to the Japanese people. The militarisation, or (to give the literal translation of the word employed in the original Japanese) the arming of the Anti-Comintern pact ought to be one of the fundamental principles of Japan's foreign policy and the Government ought to make up its mind and let the country know where it stood. The situation demanded a fundamental change in Japan's economic structure, which should be totalitarian in form and freed entirely from connexion with the Anglo-American economic bloc. It is unfortunate that the Hochi, the tone of which has as a rule been moderate, should have taken to writing in this strain; but there has recently been a change in the presidency of the company to which the paper belongs and the new management would seem to have distinct leanings to the Right.
9. To sum up the situation as I see it to-day, it may be said with confidence that the moderate elements in the Government have at last won the first round in the struggle which has been going on for the past few months. But it has been a hard fight and much depends upon the course of events in Europe, which Japan is watching with the keenest attention. The discussions here are continuing and the negotiations which His Majesty's Government are now conducting with the Government of the Soviet Union are undoubtedly one of the main points of interest, there being ample evidence that neither the Japanese Government nor the people as a whole like the idea of a rapprochement between ourselves and the country which Japan regards as her natural enemy. It is to be feared, therefore, that the conclusion of any agreement with the U.S.S.R. will strengthen the hands of the advocates of an alliance with the Axis Powers. But there is in Japan a strong body of opinion in favour of continued caution and restraint and on both sides a realisation of the importance of the decision which Japan must ultimately take. I am not, therefore, without hope that in the rounds of the struggle which are yet to be fought the advocates of moderation will continue to hold their own and that the final decision will be that which all true friends of Japan would wish her to take.
I have, &c.
R. L. CRAIGIE.
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